C. Whether an Infused Habit is Necessary

1. Opinion of Henry of Ghent

35. As to the third article [n.13], what is set down is that nature does not suffice for this act without an infused habit.

First, because nature is determined to one thing; but it is determined to desiring its own being (On Generation 2.10.336b27-29); therefore it cannot desire its own non-being, and that in whatever way the point is put (unless it be said that nature is determined only to desiring its conditioned being, which does not seem probable). Therefore every intellectual nature is more determined to desiring its own existence than to desiring God’s existence, if both could not stand together; for nature is determined to the desire of its own existence as to one natural object, to whose opposite it cannot be inclined whatever condition one supposes to hold of it; for then it would not seem to desire its own existence save under a condition.

36. Besides natural appetite seems only to regard what is agreeable to the desirer, and consequently it primarily regards that for which the agreeable thing is desired; but that is the lover himself (if it is first in regard o itself); therefore it cannot regard something else more.

2. Arguments of Others against Henry’s Opinion

37. Argument against this opinion:

First, that a part desires the being of the whole more than the being of itself, which is clear in both the macrocosm and the microcosm.

In the macrocosm because water ascends so that there not be a vacuum in the universe (as is plain in many experiments [Roger Bacon, Questions on Aristotle’s Physics; e.g. capillary action]), which however is against the particular natural inclination of water since water is naturally heavy and so tends downwards; but the universal inclination of nature dominates; for the good of the whole universe is hereby preserved, namely the continuity and contiguity of its parts, to which good it strives. In this way water is more inclined to the universal good of the universe than to a particular good.

38. The same also appears in the microcosm, for the hand exposes itself to save the head as naturally desiring more the saving of the head than other parts, and in this regard desiring the saving of the head more than itself, because the saving of the head is, as to life’s operations and vital influences, the saving of all the members.

39. From this further: since each creature is a certain participation in the divine goodness, a creature desires more the being of the divine good than the being of the good of itself; and consequently the rational creature will be able by its natural powers to love the divine good more than any other good, even than itself.

40. Besides, rational nature loves beatitude supremely, as is gathered from Augustine On the Trinity 13.5 n.8; but it loves the beatific object more than beatitude, therefore it loves that object above all things; therefore above itself. A confirmation is that someone who despairs and kills himself hates his being and yet does not hate beatitude, because he desires it could he have it; therefore he loves beatitude more than himself and so the beatific object more than himself.

3. Consideration of the Aforesaid Reasons

41. These reasons are not compelling:

Not the first [nn.37-39] because the examples do not prove the matter at issue [n.39]; for they prove only that the whole loves the good of itself (or loves the more principal parts of the whole) more than it loves the good of a less principal part.

42. The point is plain from the first experiment, about water [n.37]; for it is impossible for water to move itself upward because of some good of the universe; for from the fact it has a natural form, which is determined to one action, that form (remaining numerically the same) can never be the formal idea of acting with the opposite action; water itself, then, does not move itself upwards but is only thus moved upwards by some externally moving agent to which alone it belongs (as far as concerns its own nature) to be upwards; and so water is moved violently when one compares the mover with the proper nature of water. This part then is not loving the good of the whole, nor is it saving the whole by love; rather the whole (or the virtue regulative in the whole), to which are attributed the virtues of the universe, moves each and every part of the universe as befits the wellbeing of the whole. From this then is got that the whole universe loves the wellbeing of the whole more than the wellbeing proper to this or that part.

43. The same conclusion is got from the other example [n.38]; for the hand does not of its own desire expose itself for the whole, but the man, possessing these parts (one of which is more principal and another less principal), exposes the less principal part, which it can lose without danger to the whole, so as to save the whole and the other part which cannot be lost without loss of the whole totality.

44. And thus can you take it in the matter at issue, that God loves the wellbeing of the universe, or even its being, more than the wellbeing of one part, and loves the wellbeing of a principal part than the wellbeing of a less principal part. But you cannot get that some creature loves the being of God or the being of the universe more than its own proper being - just as in the examples given a part left to itself (considered according to its own inclination) never exposes itself to non-existence for the sake of another.

45. The likeness fails in another respect too, for if what is supposed about these parts be true, that is that they are something really of the whole and that, by saving the whole, they save themselves insofar as they have their being in the whole, yet no creature is thus a participated part of God although it is something of God as an effect or participation of him.

46. The second reason too, about beatitude [n.40], is not conclusive because it proceeds only about the affection of advantage [d.26 n.110]; among things indeed that are desired by the lover beatitude is desired most of all, but it is not loved most of all; rather that for which beatitude is desired more is loved more (as the end is loved more than what is for the end). Likewise the assumption about beatitude [n.41] is only true when speaking of it in general and not when determining it to that wherein it consists. So one does not get the conclusion that someone loves something other than himself more than he loves himself, for it has not been determined that ‘what beatitude exists in’ is other than the lover.

4. Scotus’ own Reasons against Henry

47. Without relying on these arguments then [nn.37-40], I lay down two other arguments for the principal conclusion [nn.38, 52].

The first is: natural reason shows something to the intellectual creature that is to be loved supremely, because in all objects and acts (and that in essentially ordered ones) there is something supreme, and so some supreme love -and thus some object too that is supremely lovable. But right natural reason does not show anything to be supremely lovable other than the infinite Good, because, if it did, charity would incline to the opposite of what right reason dictates and so would not be a virtue; therefore it dictates that only the infinite Good is to be supremely loved. And consequently the will has from natural resources the power for this love; for the intellect cannot rightly dictate anything which, as dictated, the will has naturally no power to aim and tend toward; or, if so, the will would be naturally bad, or at any rate it would be non-free as to tending toward anything according to the idea of good in accord with which the thing is shown to it by the intellect. And this is what was said specifically about the Angels [2 dd.4-5 n.37], that in the state of innocence they were not non-right, for they were unable then to have a non-right act; and they could not have had some non-right elicited act - but one must suppose they had some act,     therefore a right one; and no act could be right save by loving God above all things; therefore etc     .

48. The second reason is as follows: the Philosopher in Ethics 9.9.1169a18-20 holds that a brave citizen should expose himself to death for the good and utility of the republic. Now the Philosopher would not posit that such a citizen will have any reward after this life, as is plain from the many places where he doubts whether the soul is mortal or immortal, and he seems rather to incline to the negative side [cf. Ord. 4 d.43 q.2 nn.13-15] - at any rate if anyone, following natural reason, is in doubt about a future life, he should not, for the sake of a life he doubts, expose himself to risk where the loss of political good and virtue is certain. Therefore, with all future reward is set aside, it is consonant with right reason that every brave citizen wish himself not to live so that the good of the republic not perish. But according to right reason the divine and political good is more to be loved than the good of any particular thing; therefore according to right reason everyone should wish himself not to live because of the divine good.

49. Here a statement is made [Godfrey of Fontaines] that the brave man, in exposing himself to death because of the good of virtue, experiences virtue’s greatest good and greatest pleasure; and for the sake of these very great goods, though brief, he should more choose and love such an act than a life of ignominy; for one intense act is better, as is said in Ethics 9.9.1169a22-25, than any number of non-intense ones; so in this regard the brave man does not choose his own nonexistence but his best existence according to act of virtue - and this best existence is, according to right reason, more to be chosen than many other advantages along with lack of virtue.

50. Against this: he for preserving whose safety and for whom, lest evil happen, I wish something else not to be is simply to be loved more than that other thing that I do not wish for his sake not to be; but such a brave citizen, lest evil befall the republic, wishes himself and his act of virtue not to be; therefore he simply loves more the public good (which he wishes to be preserved) than himself or his act of virtue, for whose preservation he does not expose himself but for the salvation of the republic. And thus does the argument stand [n.48].

51. A third reason is added (and it is a sort of theological one), that if anyone can have, by natural power, a perfect act of virtue of loving God above all things, then he who found himself inclined to such an act could know that he was in charity, because without charity there would be no such inclination to love God above all things.

52. The consequent is false [n.51], therefore the antecedent is too.

5. Scotus’ own Opinion

53. As to this article [n.35], because of these two reasons, about the conformity of right reason and will and about the brave citizen [nn.47-48], I concede the conclusion that, at least in the state of innocence, it is possible for some will by its natural power to love God above all things.

54. To make this clear I first expound how ‘above all things’ is to be understood; second how the rational creature is obligated to this; and third why, nevertheless, a habit of charity is necessary.

a. How ‘above all Things’ is to be understood

55. As to the first point I say that ‘above all things’ can be understood extensively or intensively; namely extensively in that one love God more than all other things, because, that is, one more quickly wishes by some affection that all other things not be than that God not be; intensively in that one wishes with greater affection well-being to God than to anything else.

56. As to extension, it is commonly conceded that no single thing besides God, and not even everything together, is as valuable as God.

57. As to intension the following sort of distinction is set down, that love exceeds love either because it is more fervent or tender or because it is stronger or firmer; and these loves are said to exceed each other, as that a mother is said to love her child more fervently and tenderly while the father loves his child more strongly and firmly (because he would expose himself to a greater danger for love of his child). In this way it would be said that the love of God should be ‘above all things’ as to firmness so that nothing else could turn one away from him; but it is not necessary that it be ‘above all things’ as to tenderness and fervor and sweetness, because sometimes someone finds himself loving creatures more fervently than he otherwise loves God (as is plain in zealous types). And there is a confirmation, that if someone could, for the present state, love God supremely above all things in both ways, then he could fulfill the precept of Deuteronomy 6.5, ‘Thou shalt love the Lord thy God etc.’; but the opposite is held by the Master in the text and by Augustine, who maintain that this precept is not something we should fulfill but something we should tend toward.

58. An argument against this distinction [n.55] is that that alone is more loved which is more firmly loved; for I love that more which I less will that evil happen to, and for the preservation of whose good I expose myself out of love, for ‘to expose’ follows ‘to love’ - meaning this of the love that is an act of will and not of the other love that is a passion of the sense appetite. Although therefore some are sometimes said to love more fervently and tenderly who do not love more firmly, there is not for this reason any excess of any intellective love in them but perhaps of some passion, namely of some sense love; just as others, who are said to be devoted, sometimes feel some greater sweetness than others much more solid and firm in love of God who would a hundred times more promptly undergo martyrdom for him than others would - nor is such sweetness an act elicited by the will, but a certain passion acquired by the act of it, whereby God attracts and nourishes the little ones ‘lest they faint in the way’ [Luke 10.21, Matthew 15.32].

59. I say therefore that ‘above all things’ must be understood in both ways, extensively and intensively. For as I am held to love God above all things extensively so also am I held to love him intensively too with greater affection than simply anything else; I say ‘greater’, because it more opposes the opposite effect [sc. hate], in opposing which it could more easily be inclined to the opposite of any other love than to the opposite of the love of God.

60. As to what is added about the precept [n.57] - by the same reasoning it would have been necessary to give a precept about the vision of God, not that it be fulfilled but that we know whither we should tend - the opposite of which is sufficiently plain.

61. I say     therefore that the precept as to extension and as to intension can, according to the present way [n.53], be fulfilled by the wayfarer - but not as to all the conditions that are expressed by the additions ‘with your whole heart and your whole mind etc     .’ For a wayfarer cannot have as great a recollecting of his powers, with all impediments removed, that his will should be able to be carried forward with as great an effort as it could be if his powers were united and recollected and all impediments removed. And Augustine’s and the Master’s statement, that the precept is not fulfilled by the wayfarer [n.57], must be understood as to the same sort of intension, when all impediments are expelled and the powers recollected; for the proneness of the lower powers in this present state holds back the higher ones from the perfection of their acts.

b. How the Rational Creature is bound to love God above All Things

62. As to this point I say that the affirmative precept of Deuteronomy 6 and Matthew 22 ‘You shall love the Lord your God etc.’ is not only always obligatory against the opposite, namely that there be no act of hate, but is also obligatory for sometimes eliciting an act of love, because this act concerns the end from whose goodness comes all the moral goodness in acts that are for the end. If then a man is obliged to have some virtuous act sometimes, he is obliged to have this precept’s act sometimes, about loving the end freely. But when this should perhaps be is determined by the other divine precept, ‘Keep holy the Sabbath’ and ‘let each remain with himself’ (Exodus 20.18, 16.29-30), recollecting himself and rising up to his God; and the Church has specified it as to hearing mass on the Lord’s day (Gratian, Decrees 3 d.1 ch.64 [Ord. 3 d.9 nn.18-20]). The like does not hold of the precept to love one’s neighbor, as will appear in d.28 nn.17-20.

c. What the Habit of Charity is Necessary for

63. As to the third statement of this article, namely the habit of charity [n.54], I reply as was said elsewhere, in 1 d.17 nn.64, 69-70, namely that this habit gives to the act (as far as concerns the substance of the act) some intensity beyond what the power alone itself and by equal effort could give to the act. And however much more perfect the created power might be, it would to the same extent be imperfect if it does not have a created charity proportionally corresponding to it (I mean in arithmetical proportion, which is equality in geometrical proportion); for a lesser will, if it does not have a charity proportional to it, fails as much as a geometrically greater will seems to fail if it does not have a charity proportional to it.

64. But as to the circumstance of the act that is its ‘being accepted by God’, it was said in 1 d.17 nn.129, 152 that this act is principally in an act of charity and less principally in an act from the will.

65. I therefore say briefly what was said there about the necessity of habits because of acts, and principally the necessity of charity, as regards something that belongs to the circumstances of acts; but as to the substance of acts I say what was said there [nn.53, 65, 92-97].

66. Also as to the condition of the habit, namely that it is infused, I say what was said about faith and hope, that no one can prove such infused habits by natural reason, but it is held only by faith; and good congruity is apparent, because as to acts about God immediately elicited it does not seem probable that the higher part could be most supremely perfected save immediately by God.